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Shaping the Modern Nation: Colonial Marriage Law, Polygamy and Concubinage
in Aotearoa New Zealand
Abstract
Feminist scholars and critical theorists have critiqued marriage as a tool for the creation of a private
sphere in which women are subordinated to men, and have critiqued the public/private dichotomy (Olsen
1983, 1985, Pateman 1988, Smart 1992, Seigel 1996). Marriage jurisdiction and law also participates in
the creation of the public order, including the production of a homogenous nation opposed to cultural and
racial difference, and embracing particular notions of gender (Cott 2000: 1–8, Franke 1999, Dubler 1998).
Throughout the 19th century colonisation of Aotearoa New Zealand the jurisdictional boundaries of
colonial marriage law were increasingly constructed and policed to assimilate the indigenous Maori
people to a centralised jurisdiction while simultaneously producing race and gender difference within the
nation-state. This boundary maintenance operated through a series of statutes and cases that
participated in the production of a raced and gendered nation in two ways. First, this article discusses the
cases and statutes that extended the jurisdiction of the colonial courts, and colonial marriage laws, over
the indigenous Maori people, assimilating Maori to a centralised, homogenous set of laws and practices,
and excluding Maori marriage laws and customs from that jurisdiction, and from the emerging nationstate. These laws were increasingly rigidly applied to fix the boundaries of the nationstate. Second, this
article traces the racing and gendering of marriage jurisdiction as a process of the creation of internal
difference within the emerging nation-state. As colonisation proceeded, Maori marriage laws and
customs were increasingly excluded from the jurisdiction of the colonial courts by associating those laws
and practices with pre-modern concepts such as concubinage and polygamy and opposing them to raced
and gendered notions of civilisation and progress associated with the modern nation-state. The result
was the production of a vessel of marriage jurisdiction that aspired to modernity, purity and whiteness
and that was shaped and filled with Victorian notions of gender.
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Introduction
Feminist scholars and critical theorists have critiqued marriage as a tool
for the creation of a private sphere in which women are subordinated to
men, and have critiqued the public/private dichotomy (Olsen 1983, 1985,
Pateman 1988, Smart 1992, Seigel 1996). Marriage jurisdiction and law
also participates in the creation of the public order, including the production of a homogenous nation opposed to cultural and racial difference, and embracing particular notions of gender (Cott 2000: 1–8, Franke
1999, Dubler 1998). Throughout the 19th century colonisation of Aotearoa
New Zealand the jurisdictional boundaries of colonial marriage law were
increasingly constructed and policed to assimilate the indigenous Maori
people to a centralised jurisdiction while simultaneously producing race
and gender difference within the nation-state. This boundary maintenance operated through a series of statutes and cases that participated
in the production of a raced and gendered nation in two ways. First, this
article discusses the cases and statutes that extended the jurisdiction
of the colonial courts, and colonial marriage laws, over the indigenous
Maori people, assimilating Maori to a centralised, homogenous set of
laws and practices, and excluding Maori marriage laws and customs
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from that jurisdiction, and from the emerging nation-state. These laws
were increasingly rigidly applied to fix the boundaries of the nationstate. Second, this article traces the racing and gendering of marriage
jurisdiction as a process of the creation of internal difference within the
emerging nation-state. As colonisation proceeded, Maori marriage laws
and customs were increasingly excluded from the jurisdiction of the
colonial courts by associating those laws and practices with pre-modern concepts such as concubinage and polygamy and opposing them
to raced and gendered notions of civilisation and progress associated
with the modern nation-state. The result was the production of a vessel
of marriage jurisdiction that aspired to modernity, purity and whiteness
and that was shaped and filled with Victorian notions of gender.

Jurisdiction and national boundaries
Jurisdiction is law’s speech (Rush 1997: 150). It is the legal space, or
sphere of competence, in which the law speaks (Dorset 2000: 34).
Questions of jurisdiction involve the determination of the boundaries
of legal space in at least three manners: through territorial boundaries,
by defining what is law and what is non-law, and by subject matter.
Subject matter jurisdiction is the determination of what is included in
the law of property, or contract, or, for purposes of this analysis, what is
recognised as marriage (Ford 1999). Notions of modern territorial
jurisdiction emerged with the development of the modern nation-state
as the bounded territory in which a particular set of laws applied. Modern
territorial jurisdiction occupies a definitely bounded area,
homogeneously and abstractly conceived. Territorial jurisdiction
contributes to the construction of political subjectivity by tying
individuals to the fixed boundaries of the modern nation-state. Political
subjectivity is produced in part within this bounded area through the
consolidation of power in a centralised jurisdiction that represses and
excludes difference through homogenisation and assimilation (Ford 1999:
852–5, 905–8).
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Nineteenth century notions of nations and states were well summarised by New Zealand’s famous jurist, John Salmond:
A nation is a society of men united by common blood and descent, …
speech, religion and manners. A state … is a society of men united under
one government (Salmond 1907: 103).

Salmond went on to suggest that in every nation there is an impulse
to develop into a state. He asserts that historically, states have grown
out of nations. Where a state encompasses cultural differences it tends
to become a nation:
… the unity of political organization eliminates in course of time the national diversities within its borders, infusing throughout all its population
a new and common nationality, to the exclusion of all remembered relationship with those beyond the limits of the state (Salmond 1907: 103).

Salmond’s language provides a tie between 19th century notions of
jurisdiction and nation building. Modern nation-states are territorially
bounded, as opposed to ‘primitive’ notions of states as rule over a
group of people (Salmond 1907: 102). As part of the process of colonisation, jurisdiction contributes to nation building by providing a centralised power system for the homogenisation of individual and political identity within fixed territorial boundaries. This centralisation
facilitates the erasure, and sometimes violent elimination, of diversity
within national boundaries while it simultaneously determines those
boundaries. Salmond’s use of the seemingly neutral and naturalising
term ‘impulse’ masks a political and often violent process.
Jurisdiction participates in the homogenisation of an emerging nation
through a centralised power system. But jurisdiction also simultaneously
‘does its most important work, not by repressing local difference, but
by producing it, by dividing society into distinctive local units that are
imposed on individuals and groups’ (Ford 1999: 908). Defining the nation
in opposition to internal foes, both real and imagined, is integral to the
production of national identity (Ford 1999: 908). In the colonial context,
it is both through assimilation to the homogeneous norm, and through
the production of internal difference, that jurisdiction is closely tied to
nation building.
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Salmond’s reference to the exclusion of remembered relationships,
and more recent work on the construction of nations, provide tools for
analysing this second aspect of jurisdiction’s work. Benedict Anderson
argues that nations are imagined political communities (Anderson 1991:
6). As imagined communities, nations are the stories that are told about
collective identities, which also shape the stories that are available for
individual identities (Harris 1996: 213). The stories both privilege some
collective and individual identities and exclude and subordinate others.
The boundaries of recognisable identities define the limits of the nation, which may shift over time as stories change. A nation is defined by
its boundaries, or limits (Fitzpatrick 2001: 62–5, Stychin 1998: 4), at the
same time that the excluded ‘other’ resides within it (Stychin 1998: 4).
Cases participate in nation building by presenting stories of imagined
communities that remember some relationships and exclude others
(Harris 1996: 214). In the late 19th and early 20th century, colonial marriage cases presented stories defining ‘Maori marriage’ as foreign and
pre-modern. These cases facilitated shaping the emerging nation in
opposition as modern and white. This article demonstrates how the
extension of marriage jurisdiction and law over Maori operated both to
assimilate Maori to the emerging nation-state and to produce Maori
laws and practices as different within its boundaries.

New Zealand as a nation: imagining beginnings
In the dominant founding story of New Zealand as a nation Maori
people freely agreed in the English version of the Treaty of Waitangi
1840 (the ‘Treaty’) to cede their sovereignty to the British Crown.2
Upon the signing of the Treaty, Captain Hobson declared its implications for Maori and for the nation, stating ‘we are one nation’ (Frame
1995: 109) all British subjects, and all one community.
For most Maori, the Treaty signing did not symbolise the founding
of one nation. The Maori versions of the Treaty, signed by most Maori
leaders (Ross 1972: 136),3 did not cede sovereignty to the British. In the
Maori versions Maori retained their traditional control over their land
and people, explicitly recognised in the guarantee of te tino
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rangatiratanga (Williams 1989: 79), and in oral guarantees of Maori
laws and customs (Frame 1981: 106, Williams 1999: 116–9, Durie 1996:
460). In this story Maori simply agreed to allow the ‘lawless’ British to
establish a Government to govern themselves. The agreement in the
Maori versions of the Treaty is more properly understood as providing
for the British to govern the British while Maori retained a parallel control over Maori land and people (Walker 1989).
This story of power sharing is buttressed by the early denial by the
British Colonial Office of any intention of ruling over Maori (Moon
2002: 10, Adams 1977: 156):
It was only after the Treaty was signed, and Hobson’s dubious Proclamations of Sovereignty had arrived at London, that the possibility of British
sovereignty applying to Maori emerged as a serious consideration (Moon
2002: 185).

This ‘dubious’ status of the British in New Zealand subsequent to
the Treaty is reflected in early British policy.
Much of early British policy recognised that Maori retained their
right to govern themselves, and that Maori law and custom would continue to apply at least to Maori (Frame 1981: 105–9, Adams 1977: ch 7).
For some colonial actors this policy was consistent with continued
Maori self-governance. For others it was a temporary measure in the
assimilation of Maori to British laws and customs, or in Salmond’s terms,
the fusion of two cultures into one nation. In any case, lack of money
and resources meant that in the early years the British could at most
pretend to govern Maori, a position that induced contempt in Maori
who did have contact with the British (Adams 1977: 236, Boast 1993:
136). During these years the simple fact was that the ‘great bulk’ of
Maori continued to be governed by their own laws and customs, and
were outside the jurisdiction of the colonial courts. British laws and
customs simply did not extend to many Maori (Adams 1977: 235–7).
An 1842 editorial in the Bay of Islands Observer provides a contemporaneous statement reflecting the two governing and legal systems
operating in parallel:
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The Maoris are not and cannot be governed by the Crown [italics in original]. Those who signed it [the Treaty] and those who didn’t alike disregard
it, as far as the Government is concerned … The sovereignty over them on
the part of Great Britain is entirely nominal … Thus, there are really two
distinct communities in this country, living and more or less mingling with
each other, governed on different principles, and by different laws and
customs, and acknowledging a totally different authority (Quaife 1842).

This quote records the position of many Maori: the idea that they
had ceded the power to apply their laws and customs was simply incomprehensible (Walker 1989: 266, Moon 2002: 148, Swainson 1859),
and initially at least, the Treaty signing had little or no impact on their
lives or actions. According to Salmond’s 19th century colonising notions of nation, fusing the two cultures in New Zealand into one nation
would require eliminating diversities and creating a common nationality
by excluding relationships to those beyond the limits, or boundaries, of
the nation.
Early British policy recognising continued Maori self-governance
was implemented through colonial laws excepting or exempting Maori
from their application and through laws declaring the recognition of
Maori laws and customs. Both of these approaches participated in defining the nation.
Exempting Maori from the application of colonial laws defined the
limits of the colonial jurisdiction, and positioned Maori outside of the
jurisdictional boundaries determining the nation. Soon after his arrival
in New Zealand in 1843 Governor Fitzroy, in a speech to 200 Maori
leaders, assured them that he did not want to interfere with customs
that affected only Maori. He secured the passage of the Native Exemption Ordinance 1844, which provided for European interference with, or
responses to, crimes between Maori only upon Maori request. This
Ordinance was critiqued on the basis that it allowed Maori to maintain
‘their nationality’ (Adams 1977: 223–30). This approach positioned Maori
in parallel to the emerging colonial nation, implicitly recognising the
existence of two nations.

191

Seuffert

Recognition of Maori laws and customs brought them within the
subject matter jurisdiction of the courts, and provided the courts with
the power of defining and reshaping those laws and customs (Hohepa
& Williams 1996: 46, Williams 1999). This dynamic produced difference
within the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts and within the nation. The New Zealand Government Act 1846 provided for Maori laws,
customs and usages to be observed within certain districts in New
Zealand. The Royal Instructions accompanying the Act provided for
the setting aside of such districts, and provided that such laws should
be applied inside the districts to people who were not Maori and outside the districts between Maori. With respect to jurisdiction, the 1846
proposal provided:
The jurisdiction of the Courts and magistrates … shall extend over the said
aboriginal districts, subject only to the duty … of taking notice of and
giving effect to the laws, customs, and usages of aboriginal inhabitants
(Frame 1981: 106–7).

The creation of local districts, or sub-territorial units of difference,
is one of the ways that jurisdiction may operate to produce difference
within the nation. In the colonial context in New Zealand, where British
governance was dubious, this proposal simultaneously extended jurisdiction, providing for the fusion of Maori into the British nation, and
provided for the determination of difference within that jurisdiction by
giving effect to Maori laws. This 1846 Act was suspended, and the
districts were never set aside.
However, section 71 of the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852,
which remained in force until 1986,4 also provided for districts to be set
apart in which Maori laws, customs and usages would apply between
Maori:
It may be expedient that the laws, customs, and usages of the aboriginal or
(Maori) inhabitants of New Zealand, so far as they are not repugnant to the
general principles of humanity, should for the present be maintained for the
government of themselves, in all their relations to and dealings with each
other, and that particular districts should be set apart within which such
laws, customs, or usages should so be observed …
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The language here is couched in the qualifiers ‘may’, ‘expedient’
and ‘for the present’. This type of recognition of indigenous laws and
customs was often part of the process of the creation and containment
of difference in constructing a colonial nation:
Custom … was ‘recognized’ solely in subordination to the law of the
colonist and denied such recognition where it was ‘repugnant to natural
justice, equity, and good conscience’, or ‘contrary to the general principles
of humanity’ to take two standard and revealing formulations (Fitzpatrick
2001: 180).

‘Recognition’ of Maori laws that are not ‘repugnant’ to ‘general
principles of humanity’ aligns the colonial nation with universalist notions of civilisation and subordinates Maori laws as particularist, producing difference within that nation (Fitzpatrick 2001: 120–5). This site
of the determination of which Maori laws would be recognised and
applied, and which would be declared ‘repugnant’ to humanity, or civilisation, marks the boundary of inclusion within the jurisdiction of the
colonial courts, and the nation. Marriage law and jurisdiction illustrates
this process well.
Early marriage laws were consistent with early British policy more
generally, positioning Maori at the boundaries of the nation. While the
first Marriage Ordinance 1842 did not mention Maori,5 the second
marriage ordinance, passed in 1847,6 exempted Maori from its application. After setting out the requirements for a valid marriage and specifying that marriages might be solemnised by a minister of any Christian
denomination, the Marriage Ordinance 1847 explicitly recognised the
fact that Maori law and custom continued to apply at least to marriages
between Maori:
Nothing herein contained shall apply to any marriage which may be contracted otherwise than according to the provisions of this Ordinance between two persons both of the Native race.7

The passage of this section between the New Zealand Government
Act 1846 and the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852, both of which
provided for districts in which Maori law and custom would be applied,
suggests that its exemption of Maori was intended to implicitly recognise
193
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the continued application of Maori law and custom. This dynamic places
Maori law and custom regarding marriage outside the jurisdiction of the
colonial courts while implicitly recognising those marriages, ‘marriages
between Maori[s] in accordance with Maori custom were thus permitted
to continue and were by implication recognised as valid and legal’
(Robson 1954: 318). Marriages according to Maori law were therefore
outside the jurisdiction of the 1847 Ordinance at the same time that they
were recognisable in the courts as valid. Positioned at the boundaries
of jurisdiction, they also marked the boundaries of the territorial nation.
Consistent with these Acts, the 1847 Ordinance also stated that it
would come into operation with respect to marriages between Maori ‘in
such districts and at such times as the Governor shall by Proclamation
from time to time appoint’.8 This power to extend the jurisdiction of the
courts and marriage laws is the power to assimilate Maori, from a position
at the boundaries of jurisdiction, into the colonial legal system, and the
nation. Apparently without discussion, section 44 of the 1847 Ordinance
was reproduced in the Marriage Act 1854 with only the addition of the
word ‘aboriginal’ before ‘race’ at the end of the sentence, continuing
the positioning of Maori law with respect to marriage.9 The section was
again enacted without change in the Marriage Acts of 1880 and 1904.10
The 1850s may be characterised as a period in which colonial legislators attempted to extinguish some Maori laws and customs with Maori
consent on the basis that they were contrary to ‘civilized practices’
(Frame 1981: 107–9). The early 1860s saw the shape and boundaries of
the nation violently contested in the wars resulting from the confiscation of Maori land by the colonial Government (Mahuta 1995: 67–87,
Belich 1988). By 1865 it was still unclear, even to the colonial legislators,
whether the jurisdiction of the colonial courts extended to Maori. The
Native Rights Act 1865 expressed this anxiety explicitly in its preamble,
which stated:
An Act in response to doubts about whether the colonial courts have
jurisdiction in all cases touching the persons and property of the Maori
people.
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This Act anxiously declared that the colonial courts had jurisdiction
over Maori. It simultaneously provided for the determination of interests in land where Native title had not been extinguished according to
Maori law and custom in the newly established Native Land Courts.11 It
operated to assimilate Maori to the colonial jurisdiction and to create
difference through a sub-jurisdiction in the Native Land Court (Williams
1999: 133–55).
The split in jurisdiction between the two court systems reflected
ongoing anxiety about jurisdictional and national boundaries. This
boundary anxiety was given voice in an 1878 case in which the Court
was required to determine whether all of the owners of a piece of land
held under Maori title were capable of entering into a contract with
respect to that land. The Court stated that it was ‘quite at sea upon
such questions — at sea without chart or compass … helpless to do
anything but refer’12 to the Native Land Court. This quote reflects the
extent to which the Court has internalised notions of even subject matter jurisdiction as power over fixed territorial boundaries. It provides a
dramatic image of the Court’s anxiety at a challenge to its ability to
speak the law. Without fixed territorial boundaries that map the Court’s
jurisdiction onto the boundaries of the nation, the Court is lost at sea.
The next section discusses shoring up the boundaries of the nation
through the violent re-membering of marriage jurisdiction to exclude
Maori laws and customs.

Re-membering the nation
I have argued that the successive Marriage Acts positioned Maori
marriage at the boundaries of the nation by exempting it from the requirements of the Acts while implicitly providing for its recognition as
valid. In 1888 Chief Justice Prendergast was to ignore the early history
of the colony, violently erasing Maori law and custom with respect to
marriage, unequivocally excluding it from the boundaries of jurisdiction, and from the nation.
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Prendergast signalled this tide change in 1877 in his startling and
unprecedented decision in Wi Parata v The Bishop of Wellington. The
case involved land that had been gifted by Ngati Toa to a Church for
use of as a school for local Maori, and had not been used for that
purpose. In Wi Parata Prendergast, writing for the Full Court, held that
the Court had no jurisdiction to avoid the Crown grant, even where it
was inconsistent with the original grant (78). In dicta he adamantly, and
incorrectly, asserted that the British Government had never recognised
Maori law and custom because it did not exist (79, Frame 1981: 109,
Hackshaw 1989: 113). Prendergast dismissed the recognition of Maori
law and custom in the Native Rights Act 1865, discussed above:
As if some such body of customary law did in reality exist. But a phrase in
a statute cannot call what is non-existent into being (79).

In Salmond’s terms, the decision in Wi Parata operates to eliminate
diversities within the nation’s borders. Maori law and custom are ‘nonexistent’, or outside the boundaries of the nation. This characterisation
excludes ‘all remembered relationship with those beyond the limits of
the state’. Prendergast’s decision literally re-members the nation by
erasing or cutting off not only any recognition of Maori laws and practices in colonial law, but any existence at all of those laws and practices.
He recreates the nation as one in which Maori laws and customs never
existed.
The language in Prendergast’s decision buttressed the erasure of
Maori law and custom, creating a new fantasy of an emerging modern
nation. The Court categorises Maori as uncivilised barbarians, and the
land they inhabited as ‘thinly peopled by barbarians without any form
of law or civil government’ (77). Maori are positioned as uncivilised,
dispersed, ‘primitive barbarians’ without law, in opposition to the
civilised unified nations of the world (78). The Court also defines what
is meant by civilisation in opposition to the slippery and ill-defined
words ‘barbarian’ and ‘savage’. ‘Primitive’ invokes the pre-modern past,
and ‘barbarians’ connotes inferiority, ‘lack of refinement, sensitivity,
learning or artistic or literary culture; uncivilized’ (Longman 1984). Maori
are defined as inferior by their ‘lack’ and the emerging nation-state is
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defined in opposition to its own pre-modern past. Opposition to
‘barbarian’ positions national identity as an intricate quilt of refinement,
sensitivity, artistry, culture and civilisation.
In practical terms, the Court’s decision in Wi Parata legitimated the
Colonial Government in extinguishing Maori title to land without purchasing it. The case was decided during the ‘Vogel period’ of immigration, between 1870 and 1885, when the central government provided
assistance focused on attracting immigrants for public works and development more generally. During the Vogel period the non-Maori population of New Zealand increased from 248,400 to 575,226 (Simpson 1997:
169–80). The Court’s reference to an uncivilised past where New Zealand was ‘thinly peopled’, at a time when there is an influx of settlers to
New Zealand, also positions high density population, and colonisation, as an aspect of civilisation. Wi Parata facilitated the ongoing
confiscation of Maori land, necessary to the financing of the infrastructure of the new state, and demanded by the increasing numbers of
settlers. It legitimated over 100 pieces of legislation to ‘legalise’ Maori
dispossession from Maori land. It has been argued that all of these
pieces of legislation were enacted in breach of the Treaty (Jackson
1993: 77).
While Prendergast’s decision in Wi Parata has been the subject of
much analysis and debate (Jackson 1993, McHugh 1991, Seuffert 1998:
88, Hackshaw 1989), his application of a similar analysis to the Marriage Act 1880 has largely escaped notice (Robson 1954). In 1887 the
vast majority of Maori were still marrying according to their own laws,
and no doubt assumed that their marriages were valid. In that year only
13 marriages between two Maori people were contracted under the
Marriage Act 1880. The Registrar General’s report on statistics in New
Zealand in 1887 simply states that ‘the number of marriages does not
include those between persons both of whom are of the aboriginal
native race, these people being expressly excluded from the operation
of the Marriage Act’.13
Rira Peti v Ngaraihi Te Paku involved a will that was contested by
Te Paku. The second issue in the case was whether the sole legatee
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under the will was married to one of the witnesses and therefore could
not take under the will.14 Prendergast acknowledged the provision excepting Maori marriages from the requirements of the 1847 Ordinance
and its reenactment in the Marriage Acts 1854 and 1880 (237). He stated
that the Marriage Ordinance 1842 had not been expressly repealed; it
was impliedly repealed by the Marriage Ordinance 1847 ‘except as to
such marriages as were excepted from the operation of that [1847] Ordinance’. He therefore concluded:
Unless there is some other law on the subject, marriage between persons of
the native race is governed by the common law of England as modified by
the Marriage Ordinance of 1842 (238).

Prendergast concludes that there is no other law on the subject.
The subject matter jurisdiction of the Court with respect to marriage
extends only to colonial marriage laws (237). Prendergast extends the
jurisdiction of the courts over Maori, bringing them within the purview
of a homogenous set of laws. He simultaneously defines Maori as different by subordinating ‘their usages’ to the ‘laws of the land’:
The natives are British subjects, their relations to each other are governed
by the laws of the land, and not by their usages, unless, and only so far as
these laws have provided for the recognition of their usages (239).

An analysis of colonial marriage law such as the one that I have
provided suggests that a marriage according to Maori law was indeed a
part of the law of New Zealand. However, Prendergast concludes that
since ‘[M]aori usages in relation to any other subject than land titles or
claims have not been recognized’ (238) Maori marriage law is not a part
of the law of New Zealand. This statement ignores 20 years of British
policy in New Zealand, and the legislative context and intent of the
section exempting Maori marriages from the successive Marriage Acts.
Many Maori continued to marry according to Maori law and custom
long after Prendergast’s decision in Rira Peti; as late as 1936 it was
noted that the number of Maori customary marriages were far in excess
of those entered into under the successive Marriage Acts.15
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In 1891 the Marriage Ordinance 1842 was repealed because the
legislature recognised that it had ‘ceased to be in force or become
unnecessary’.16 This statement was consistent with interpreting the
exemptions from the Marriage Acts as recognising Maori marriages,
rather than as invoking the 1842 Ordinance.
In 1901 in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker the Privy Council held that an
action to restrain the Commissioner of Land from selling land when the
Native title had not been extinguished according to law could be maintained. The Court in Nireaha rejected the contention, based on
Prendergast’s dicta in Wi Parata, that no suit could be brought upon a
Native title because there was no ‘ancient custom and usage of the
Maori people’ (79) on which Native title could be based (384):
Their Lordships think that this argument goes too far, and that it is rather
late in the day for such an argument to be addressed to a New Zealand
Court. It does not seem possible to get rid of the express words of ss. 3 and
4 of the Native Rights Act, 1865, by saying (as the Chief Justice said in the
case referred to) that ‘a phrase in a statute cannot call what is non-existent
into being’ (382).

The Court states that the legislation of both the Imperial Parliament
and the Colonial Legislature is consistent with its view that the Native
Rights Act 1865 must be interpreted to recognise Native title until it has
been extinguished. The Privy Council’s rejection of Prendergast’s
statement in Wi Parata, combined with the statement of legislative intent
in repealing the Marriage Ordinance 1842 should have been enough
to confirm that Prendergast’s decision in Rira Peti was incorrect.
However, as Wi Parata’s legacy of legislation dispossessing Maori of
land, and the cases discussed below, highlight, the colonial courts and
legislature were happy to ignore the Privy Council decision (Williams
2003: 12).
The Courts continued to follow the flawed precedent set in Rira
Peti. In Rex v Kingi the Court refused to recognise a Maori marriage,
resulting in the extension of the jurisdiction of the colonial courts into
the intimate lives of Maori. Wairemu Kingi was married to a Maori woman
under the age of 16 in a formal Maori ceremony conducted by rangatira
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(chiefs) (372). He was then indicted for having carnal knowledge of a
girl under the age of 16. Charging the grand jury in Rex v Kingi Chapman
J stated:
These parties are referred to as having made a customary Maori marriage.
The man took the girl away and lived with her. You cannot take into account
the so-called Maori custom. … A man of either race is responsible to this
Court if he has intercourse with a girl under the age of sixteen … the Court
does not recognise the so-called marriages (371).

While the Court does not mention Rira Peti, its precedent is followed. Maori laws and customs are again excluded from the jurisdiction
of the court, at the same time that criminal jurisdiction is extended over
Maori. The result is that this Maori man, important enough to be married in a ceremony by rangatira, is brought within the nation through
the extension of jurisdictional boundaries and simultaneously produced
as an internal foe of the nation through the criminal law (Fitzpatrick
2001: 180).
The case does not give the age of Kingi’s wife. Young women could
be legally married at the age of 12 at the time (Robson 1954: 320). European men were therefore not indictable for having carnal knowledge of
a young woman between the ages of 12 and 16 if they were married to
her under European law, but Maori men married according to Maori law
to a young woman under the age of 16 were criminals. It is therefore
incorrect for the Court to state that a ‘man of either race’ is indictable for
intercourse with young women under the age of 16. Rex v Kingi also
holds that as they are not married, Kingi’s wife can be compelled to give
evidence against him in the case (372–3).
John Salmond also refused to recognise the problems with Rira
Peti when he drafted the Native Land Act 1909 as Counsel to the Law
Drafting Office. In his theoretical work Salmond recognises that Courts
‘must in general take it absolutely for granted that the legislature has
said what it meant, and meant what it has said’ (Fitzgerald 1966: 132–3).
However, in the Native Land Act 1909 he does not adopt the legislature’s clear statement that the Marriage Ordinance 1842 was repealed
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because it was unnecessary, and conclude that Prendergast’s decision
in Rira Peti was incorrect. Instead he concludes that repeal of the
Ordinance was ‘apparently in forgetfulness of the fact that, though no
longer required in respect of European marriages, it was still an operative enactment with respect to Maori marriages’.17 Salmond invents a
new rule of legislative forgetfulness. His assertion that after the repeal
of the 1842 Ordinance Maori can marry either under the Marriage Act
or the common law of England by a clergyman of the English or Roman
Catholic church also ignores the Privy Council’s rejection of
Prendergast’s conclusion in Wi Parata.18
The refusal of the colonial judiciary and legislature to consider the
implications of the Privy Council decision in Nireaha highlight the tide
change from early (British) colonial policy recognising Maori law and
practices, to New Zealand’s late 19th century emergence from residual
British control as a Dominion. The dance of national identity emerging
from imperial identity was a complex one. New Zealanders saw themselves and the emerging nation as part of an experiment for the production of a ‘Better Britain’. New Zealand considered itself the English
colony that remained most faithful to the mother country, and many
New Zealanders were proud to identify as British, both culturally and
racially (Gibbons 1998: 309, 314). The image of New Zealanders as having a ‘special destiny as the vanguard of British civilization’, the finest
of all civilisations, resulting in New Zealand being dubbed ‘God’s own
country’, was strong. New Zealand’s national identity was promoted as
separate from imperial identity while deriving its coherence and stability from its flexible incorporation of Imperialist ideologies — ‘primarily
racism and cultural superiority’ (O’Neill 1993: 24). Rejecting the Privy
Council’s decision in Nireaha served to both buttress New Zealand’s
emergence as an independent nation at the same time that it facilitated
producing that nation as racially and culturally pure.
Prendergast, Chapman and Salmond were three of New Zealand’s
most influential 19th century judges (Frame 1995: 11, Hohepa & Williams
1996, Spiller 1991). Salmond’s interpretation of Rira Peti, and his failure
to re-think the flawed precedent it set, contributed to solidifying Rira
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Peti as a precedent. Chapman repeats this precedent in Rex v Kingi and
in other judgments, and it is followed in other cases.19 The erasure of
Maori laws and customs in these cases facilitated aspirations to racial
purity. Once Maori laws and customs were erased, Maori were assimilated into aspirations to a better Britain with flimsy arguments (Hanson
1989: 892) that they were descended from the same common stock as
the Anglo-Saxon (Gibbons 1998: 313, Reeves 1899: 417). In the cases
discussed below, Maori are assimilated to the race and gender assumptions of the colonial laws and the emerging nation, at the same time as
the cases produce them as different within that jurisdiction and within
the nation.

Solidifying difference within the nation
In this section I further explore the raced and gendered operation of
marriage jurisdiction in colonial New Zealand. During the late 19th and
early 20th centuries, following precedents set by the cases I have discussed, jurisdictional lines were increasingly drawn in ways that solidified race and gender differences within the emerging nation-state, and
its emerging identity as a ‘Better Britain’. Difference was produced by
‘racing’ the actions of parties in the cases. Colonial marriage practices
and a range of the other actions were labelled European or civilised, and
by implication white, while others were positioned in opposition to
these traits. Simultaneously, courts worked anxiously to produce gender differences among Maori by projecting Victorian notions of gender
onto parties in the cases, especially Maori women.
Tutua Teone v Tipene provides an example of the solidification of
the precedent in Rira Peti, and of the centralisation of authority through
the extension of jurisdictional boundaries. It also participates in producing difference within the nation by dividing society into distinctive
local units. The case considers the meaning of common law marriage for
Maori. We Teo Tipene and Meri Tipene, married according to Maori
law, purported to adopt Robert as husband and wife under the Adoption of Children Act 1895. When Teo Tipene died his nephews and
nieces sought a declaratory judgment that Robert was not his adopted
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son, in part on the basis that Teo and Meri were not married.20 According to Prendergast’s reasoning in Rira Peti, after the repeal of the 1842
Ordinance Maori were left with the choice of marrying under the Marriage Act 1880 or the common law.
The Tipenes were not married under the 1880 Act. The issue was
therefore whether they were married at common law. Teo and Meri:
lived and cohabited together nominally as husband and wife for a number of
years, living in the midst of the members of the hapu or tribe to which they
belonged, and surrounded by their relatives. They were known as Mr and
Mrs Tipene (650).

The Court finds that if two people had been living as the Tipene’s
had in a British community, openly and notoriously as husband and
wife, accepted as lawfully married, there would be a strong presumption
at common law that they were lawfully married:
In a British community, amongst British people, persons living as these
two were would be regarded as either lawfully husband and wife or living in
a state of concubinage. If reputed to be living in the latter state, they would
lose caste among their neighbors, and be probably ostracized amongst the
respectable members of the community. Their reputation amongst near
relatives and friends would be established as a matter of common knowledge, and if that reputation was of a lawful marriage it would be, at common
law, strongly presumptive of such a marriage (650).

The Tipene’s lived among their relatives and friends, and were respected as lawfully married. However, the Court does not find that they
are married at common law. Instead, it notes that the application of the
common law in New Zealand is subject to any difference in conditions
from Britain (649). Maori marriages are one of those differences. When
Maori couples live together openly and notoriously as husband and
wife it is not because they are accepted as lawfully married, but instead
because they are accepted as married according to Maori custom, which
is ‘not a marriage in law’ (651). The Court holds that the strong common
law presumption of marriage is therefore rebutted (649–51). Teo and
Meri are identified as internal foes, living not ‘lawfully as husband and
wife’, but ‘in a state of concubinage’. The Court’s determination places
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them in the category of people ‘ostracized by the respectable members
of the community’, suggesting that the members of the hapu and their
relatives are also not respectable members of the community, as they
have not ostracised Teo and Meri. Teo and Meri and their community
are produced as different from, although within, the imagined, respectable community of the nation by virtue of their Maori marriage. The
Court’s refusal to recognise Maori marriages participates in producing
an image of the nation, or the imagined community, as white and Christian. Marriage law and jurisdiction here operates to police the boundaries of what will be recognised within the nation.
Another case that illustrates the production of difference within the
jurisdiction of the nation is Matiu v Monika Rewiti & Another,21 decided by Chapman in 1907 under the Marriage Act 1904. Matiu claimed
that he was the husband of Monika and brought the action to dissolve
the marriage on the basis that she had committed adultery with another.22 Monika defended the case on the basis that there was no valid
marriage between her and Matiu and therefore there could be no adultery.23 Matiu and Monika were originally married according to Maori
law.24 The Court notes that the couple were urged by ‘some ladies who
take an interest in improving the moral condition of Maoris’,25 presumably a white women’s church group, to marry before a clergyman of the
Church of England. The fact of the church marriage is relevant to whether
the marriage is recognisable in the colonial courts under the precedent
set in Rira Peti, but the motivation for the church marriage is irrelevant.
The Court’s mention of the ‘ladies’ recognises the role of white women
in shaping the nation to a culturally specific set of moral standards
(Brookes 1992: 25, Burton 1994: 82–3, Bland 1992: 43). If Matiu and
Monika needed to get married in the church to improve their moral
condition, by implication their Maori marriage was immoral. The role of
the women’s church group is to shepherd Maori into the moral boundaries of the colonising community. The court’s jurisdiction under Rira
Peti recognises the marriage only because a clergyman of the Church
of England is involved. This recognition follows the moral boundaries,
which delineate difference within the new nation. European, white and
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Christian are good, moral attributes, while Maori people, laws and practices are ‘marked’ as immoral and raced as ‘other’. Further, by juxtaposing ‘ladies’ with the ‘moral condition of Maoris’ and labelling Monika
and Matiu’s marriage as immoral, the Court is also excluding Monika
from the category ‘lady’.
While Matiu and Monika were married before a clergyman, they did
not obtain a marriage licence. They later separated and Monika entered
a relationship with a new partner. Monika, unsure whether her marriage
to Matiu presented an obstacle, refused to re-marry until the situation
was clarified. They therefore sent a telegram to a solicitor asking ‘Can a
person legalise a marriage without a marriage certificate?’ and received
the answer ‘No’. 26 As there had been no marriage certificate for the
marriage with Matiu, Monika concluded that there was no legal obstacle to a new marriage, and married her new partner according to Maori
law. Monika’s diligence in attempting to ascertain her legal position can
only be seen as exemplary.
In considering Matiu’s application to dissolve the marriage, the
Court noted that the solicitor’s reply to Monika’s telegram ‘satisfied
both parties, who apparently failed to observe that the matter of their
races was not mentioned in the telegram’.27 The answer to the question
that they posed depended on their race. Or, to put it another way, they
failed to observe that they were ‘marked’ by race, and that if they asked
the question in a manner that was not marked by race, they would
receive an answer that applied only to those ‘unmarked’ by race, white
settlers. The presumption of whiteness in the solicitor’s answer to the
question, and Chapman’s placement of the blame for not realising that
they were marked by race on Monika and her new partner,28 also highlights that the marriage jurisdiction of the courts occupies the position
of the dominant race, unmarked and white. The Court further emphasises difference between Maori and European by stating that ‘the proceedings of the parties were quite unlike what would be expected of
colonists of European origin’29 and, ‘I think some allowance must be
made for people living as these people live …’30
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Matiu v Monika also operates to produce gender difference. Following the reasoning in Rira Peti the Court notes that section 2 of the
Marriage Act 1904 excepts Maori from its application, although the
parties were married by a clergyman.31 The Marriage Act 1904 requires
knowing and willing disregard of the requirement for a marriage certificate in order for a marriage to be invalidated (644). The Court therefore
frames the issue as whether both parties knowingly disregarded this
requirement. It refuses to so find:
Here it is not actually proved that both parties knew of the absence of a
[marriage] certificate. The wife may have quite well left all of the preliminaries to the husband to attend to (644).

Here the Court produces a particular type of gender difference by
assuming that Monika, as a good passive Victorian wife, would have
left all of the marriage preliminaries to her husband, Matiu (Stanley
1989: 4, 14, Fishman 2002: 73). There is no need for the Court to make
Monika into a compliant wife to decide this question; the first sentence
of the quote above was sufficient to decide the issue. The Court’s
insistence on constructing Monika as a compliant wife suggests its
anxiety with being confronted by Monika’s agency and intelligence.
Spurred by this anxiety, the Court produces a fantasy of a particular,
non-threatening brand of gender difference that domesticates Maori
women.
The use of this gender fantasy in Matiu v Monika is not an isolated
occurrence. It was repeated in 1921 in Renata Te Ni v Tuihata Te Awhi
& Rotia Hini. There the Court declined to address the issue of whether
the exemption from the Marriage Act 1880 applied where one of the
parties was a ‘half-caste’ (730). Instead it framed the issue as whether
the Marriage Act 1880 required that a marriage by a Clergyman of the
Church of England was valid without a certificate of registration (730).
As in Matiu v Monika, the Court noted the requirement of proof that
both parties knew that a certificate had not been issued in order to
invalidate the marriage (730). It refused to assume that the Maori woman
knew there was no certificate, concluding:
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It may more reasonably be assumed that this Maori woman left the arrangements for the marriage in the hands of her half-caste husband and
believed that all things necessary for the due celebration of the marriage had
been duly accomplished by him (731).

Here ideas about both race and gender are operating. It is a ‘Maori
woman’ who is passive in relation to a ‘half-caste’ husband. The races
of the parties are mentioned, as though it is, if anything, ‘more reasonable’ that a Maori woman would believe that her half-caste husband
would duly make the necessary arrangements.
In both of these cases the marriages are found to be valid only to be
dissolved as a result of the husbands’ petitions for dissolution. The
same result would have been reached by the Courts’ refusal to assert
jurisdiction over these marriages. The Courts might have declined to
follow Rira Peti. The Courts might have held that marriages between
two Maori people were exempted from the Marriage Acts and that Maori
laws applied to both their creation and dissolution. Instead the Courts
assert jurisdiction over the parties and declare the marriages valid only
to dissolve them. These cases solidify the extension of the reach of the
law in a manner that legitimises the regulation of the lives and affairs of
Maori people. In the process of assimilating Maori to the race and
gender assumptions of the colonial laws and the emerging nation, the
cases produce them as different within that jurisdiction and within the
nation.

Concubinage and polygamy:
modernising the nation
Matiu v Monika is one of a series of marriage cases that produce difference within the new colonial nation. A number of these cases produce
difference by opposing marriage to concubinage and polygamy, associating marriage with modernity, civilisation, progress and whiteness,
and concubinage and polygamy with Maori law and custom, degeneration and backwardness.
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In the discussion of Tutua Teone v Tipene above I argued that the
language that Chapman used in refusing to recognise Teo and Mere’s
relationship as a common law marriage categorised it instead as ‘living
in a state of concubinage’. In Rangi Kerehoma v Public Trustee Chapman
again relied on the concept of concubinage in stating categorically:
There is only one marriage law in New Zealand for all races, and there is no
status of concubinage such as is recognized in some countries, and the socalled marriage according to Maori custom is no marriage in law. It results in
a voluntary cohabitation: but a man may have several such unions at the
same time and may dissolve them at will, and the woman may do the like
(905).32

The Court’s reference to ‘several such unions’ is an allusion to
polygamy, tying concubinage and polygamy together. In Re Wi Tamahau
Mahupuku, Thompson v Mahupuku the Court quotes the language
above and makes explicit reference to polygamy:
There is no evidence as to how the sexual relationship in the present case
was brought about, but it would appear that in what is termed a ‘Maori
customary marriage’ no formality whatsoever is required, the parties simply live together, and if they tire of each other they separate without
formality and enter into fresh relations with others, and that which, if the
marriage were a legal one, would be termed polygamy is recognized (1399).

The language the Courts are using here is doing two things. First, it
is assimilating Maori laws and practices to known concepts within the
common law. This involves reshaping and reproducing Maori laws and
customs as the equivalent of concubinage and polygamy, concepts
that lie at the boundaries of the common law. At the same time, the
Courts are opposing ‘modern’ colonial marriage to the (immoral) premodern practices of concubinage and polygamy, thus reproducing the
Maori law and practices as different from, and less than, common law
marriage. Positioned in opposition to common law marriage, Maori law
is excluded from the nation at the same time that it defines it. This
dynamic positions Maori law at the boundary of the nation.
The terms ‘concubinage’ and ‘polygamy’ operated in the colonial
period in opposition to modernity as ‘cohering, “quilting” point[s],
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bringing together the disparate dimensions of modern identity’
(Fitzpatrick 2001: 65). In order to operate in this manner these concepts
had to be both apart from modern identity and yet recognisably related
to it, and had to provide opposites to the aspects of modern identity
that they were to ‘quilt’ together (Fitzpatrick 2001: 64). Aspects of modernity might be ‘quilted’ in opposition to a degenerate or ‘savage and
barbaric’ past, which modernity must guard against (Stychin 1998: 4).
In the British common law system, concubinage has a long history
as the opposite of marriage, associated with the unstable early modern
period when the law lacked clarity as to what constituted a valid marriage (Stone 1992: 16–7). Those with property to protect were likely to
be careful to legalise their unions as part of the formal legal process of
dealing with their property. However, large numbers of English men and
women, especially the propertyless poor, engaged in a range of informal marriage practices, such as ‘broomstick weddings’ (Parker 1989:
133) right through the late 18th and into the 19th century. Part of the
project of modernity included attempting to regularise sexual and marital behaviour and punish deviants, including minimising recognition
for informal marriage practices, the results of which were labelled as
concubinage (Stone 1992: 17). This historical process positioned
concubinage at the boundary of the common law, used to delineate the
difference between pre-modern and modern. The term denoted a set of
practices that represented pre-modern uncertainty and instability in the
law of marriage, ‘quilting’ the definition of modern marriage in opposition as clearly delineated and stable.
Concubinage was also practised in ‘foreign’ colonies. By the end of
the 19th century living in ‘concubinage’ with a local woman was the
most common arrangement for male European colonists in the Indies
(Stoler 1997: 347–8). ‘Concubinage’ in this context was used to refer to
cohabitation outside of marriage between European men and Asian
women; it included sexual access to the woman, demands on her labour
and legal rights to her children. European plantation employees, and
corporate and government decision-makers were encouraged to find
local ‘companions’ and often prohibited from marrying (Stoler 1997:
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348–9). Chapman’s reference to the ‘status of concubinage such as is
recognized in some countries’ may have been a reference to these official practices. His statement positions concubinage as foreign, outside
of the nation and the jurisdictional boundaries of the Courts. It defines
the nation in opposition to concubinage.
Thus in the late 19th century concubinage was positioned as both
foreign and pre-modern. The association of Maori marriage laws and
practices with concubinage operated similarly to position those law
and practices as foreign, pre-modern, and outside the jurisdictional
boundaries of the Court.
Polygamy was also a term opposed to modernity. David Hume made
this explicit in the mid-18th century, ‘[t]he exclusion of polygamy and
divorces sufficiently recommends our present European practice with
regard to marriage’ (Hume 1742 in Nussbaum 1994: 149). At the end of
the 18th century polygamy was positioned as foreign and outside the
boundaries of England as a nation:
England’s toying with and ultimate rejection of polygamy near the end of
the eighteenth century is part of the nation’s defining itself both as distinct
from and morally superior to the polygamous Other. Monogamy is instituted as part of England’s national definition, and whatever practices its
explorers might find to tempt them in other worlds, England asserts its
public stance that marriage means one man, one wife, at least in law
(Nussbaum 1994: 149).

The ‘toying’ with polygamy suggests its relation to modern identity
at the same time that its rejection positions it in opposition. In the 18th
and early 19th century polygamy included a multiplicity of practices, a
husband taking more than one wife, marrying after the death of the first
wife, or seducing one woman while being married to another (Nussbaum
1994). Modern marriage might therefore also be ‘quilted’ in opposition
to these practices as one man and one ‘wife’ in a lifetime (Hartog 2000: 95).
In the last third of the 19th century theories of both evolutionism and
racial categorisation gained influence. The idea that civilisation itself
was a racial trait achieved by whites and handed down by birthright
gained prevalence (Cott 2000: 117). Christianity ranked all peoples along

210

Shaping the Modern Nation

a linear and chronological scale of racial development; from savagism
to barbarism, both marked by race, to white civilisation. Christianity
linked with the modern notion of progress by assuming that all peoples
had the potential to be saved, but the road was longer for those not
already white and civilised. Monogamy was associated with Christianity,
European descent, and whiteness. Monogamous marriage was touted
as a primary distinction between Europeans and Asians, closely
associated with the civilisation of the white race. Without monogamous
marriage the very being of the white race would be destroyed (Cott
2000: 114).
The modern notion of evolution and the association of polygamy
with the pre-modern, pre-civilisation, and tribal practices, were also
apparent in New Zealand. These characterisations of polygamy were to
be found in Chancellor James Kent’s Commentaries on American Law
(Cott 2000: 114), an American treatise that was influential in the colonisation of New Zealand (Gipps 1840). In 1897 the Otago Daily Times
published an article reflecting the view of polygamy as a degenerate
practice associated with pre-modernity:
According to the rationalistic view, … marriage is simply an outcome of
something inherent in human nature, and is subject to development as other
institutions are, such as the family and the State. It is the result of a process
of evolution from tribal promiscuity and ‘marriage by capture,’ through
polyandry and polygamy, to the very imperfect form of monogamy now
prevailing (MacGregor 1897).

Here the family, state and marriage evolve and progress along familiar late 19th century racial lines, from the savagism of tribal practices to
still evolving civilisation of white Europeans. Polygamy is represented
evolutionarily as pre-monogamy, and therefore also pre-modern.
Chapman’s statement in Rangi Kerehoma, quoted above, aligns
New Zealand with the project of modernity by clearly delineating the
difference between colonial marriage laws that produce valid marriages,
and concubinage, polygamy and ‘marriage according to Maori custom’,
all of which are ‘no marriage in law’. The idea that polygamy is a premodern practice is also reflected in Chapman’s decision in Rex v Kingi:
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If the Maori people were permitted to go back to Maori custom with
respect to marriages, and to call those unions marriages, that might include
polygamous marriages … the Court does not recognise the so-called marriages
(372).

The reference to going ‘back’ to Maori custom here places Maori
laws in the past, static and not evolving, in the pre-modern, uncivilised
era. The possibility of degeneration, or slipping into a ‘savage’ or premodern past associated with polygamy is an evil that modernity must
guard against.
The cases discussed in this section further the project of solidifying New Zealand as a white, Christian nation-state by drawing jurisdictional and national boundaries in marriage cases that exclude Maori
marriage laws and practices through associating them with the premodern, raced concepts of concubinage and polygamy.

Conclusion
This article has demonstrated that cases on marriage laws in colonial
New Zealand participate in the production of a particularly raced and
gendered nation. Early British policy exempting Maori from colonial
marriage laws reflected Maori interpretations of the Treaty of Waitangi,
providing for Maori self-governance and the continued application of
Maori laws and practices. The Treaty’s agreement for power sharing in
the governance of New Zealand had the potential to produce new images
of community, moving beyond 19th century colonial notions of nation.
However, interpretations of marriage laws in the colonial courts by New
Zealand’s most influential judges failed to recognise that potential.
Instead these judgments reproduced 19th century ideas about nations
by positioning Maori laws and practices outside of increasingly rigidly
defined national boundaries. At the same time those laws and practices,
and the political identities of Maori people within the nation’s jurisdiction,
were produced as different. The decisions in each of these cases involved
an historical moment in which the judges exercised an ethical choice to
proceed down the path of building a colonial nation based on the violent
erasure of the Treaty’s agreement of power sharing.
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Notes
1

I would like to thank all of the participants in the ‘Law, History and
Postcolonial Theory and Method’ Symposium held at the University of
Waikato in December of 2002 for their stimulating presentations and discussion, which contributed to the development of this article. I would also
like to thank Catharine Coleborne for her energy, enthusiasm and unflagging
patience in co-organising the symposium and co-editing this special edition
of Law Text Culture. Finally, thanks to the anonymous referees of this
article, who provided kind and helpful insights and advice.

2

For the extent to which this dominant story still prevails see Moon 2002:
10: ‘I assumed — like most other people — that there were certain facts
about the Treaty that were beyond the reach of challenge even by the most
incorrigible historian or analyst. … One fact in particular stood out clearly
… that the purpose of the treaty was for the British Crown to assert
sovereignty over Maori. Yet the more I considered this assertion in the light
of evidence I was uncovering, the less it seemed to stand up to close
scrutiny.’

3

Only 39 of the 541 Maori signatures were to an English text.

4

Constitution Act 1986 (NZ).

5

The Marriage Ordinance 1842 was one section long. It extended validity
to future and retrospective marriages performed by any minister of any
Christian denomination. This ordinance extended religious freedom by modifying the common law of England, which limited valid marriages to those
performed by a properly ordained minister of the Church of England or the
Roman Catholic Church.

6

Marriage Ordinance 1847 (NZ).

7

Marriage Ordinance 1847 (NZ) s 44.

8

Marriage Ordinance 1847 (NZ) s 44.

9

Marriage Act 1854 (NZ) s 47.

10 Marriage Act 1880 (NZ) s 2; Marriage Act 1904 (NZ) s 2.
11 Native Rights Act 1865 (NZ) s 4; Native Lands Act 1862 (NZ); Native
Lands Acts 1865 (NZ).
12 Horomona & Others v Drowner (1878) Vol IV NS 104, Supreme Court at
107.
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13 BPP, Colonies, New Zealand, 17, Irish Uni Press Series (1969), Report by
the Register General on the Statistics of the Colony for 1887 at 82.
14 Te Paku first claimed that the deceased was not of sound mind when he
made the will, that it was procured under undue influence, and that in the
absence of a will she would be entitled to the property according to Maori
custom. The first part of the judgment was not recorded except for a note
stating that the judge found against Ngaraihi on those claims: (1888) 7
NZLR 235 at 236.
15 Tutua Teone v Tipene [1936] NZLR 642 at 651.
16 The Repeals Act 1891 (NZ) Title.
17 Introduction to the Native Land Act 1909, Public Acts of New Zealand
1908–1931, vol 6 at 92–5.
18 In Parker v Parker [1921] NZLR 732, Salmond apparently forgot that the
Marriage Ordinance 1842 had been repealed. After noting that the Marriage Act 1880 exempted Maori from its provisions, Salmond stated, ‘Marriages, therefore, between Maoris might in the year 1897, in pursuance of
the Marriage Ordinance 1842, be validly celebrated before a minister of
any Christian denomination without a Registrar’s certificate or other formal prerequisite.’ Id at 732.
19 Matiu v Monika Rewiti & Another (1907) 26 NZLR 642 (see discussion
below); Rangi Kerehoma v Public Trustee [1918] NZLR 903, [1918] GLR
483 (discussed below); Re Wi Tamahau Mahupuku, Thompson v Mahupuku
[1932] NZLR 1397 at 1399 (citing Rira Peti; quoting Rangi Kerehoma v
Public Trustee at 485); Tutua Teone v Tipene [1936] NZLR 642 at 651
(quoting Rangi Kerehoma v Public Trustee [1918] GLR 483 at 485).
20 The first issue argued was that there was no formal order of adoption. The
Court held that despite the fact that a verbal order had been made, the lack
of a formal order, apparently due to the oversight of the lawyer, invalidated
the adoption under the Adoption of Children Act 1895. [1936] NZLR 642,
646; affirmed Tipene v Tutua Teone [1937] NZLR1098. The Court of Appeal did not reach the issue of whether Teo and Meri were married for
purposes of the Adoption of Children Act 1895.
21 (1907) 26 NZLR 642; (1907) 9 GLR 351. The GLR provides a more
complete record of the case. References will therefore be made to both
reporters.
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22 (1907) 26 NZLR 642.
23 (1907) 26 NZLR 642 at 643.
24 (1907) 9 GLR 351 at 352.
25 (1907) 9 GLR 351 at 352.
26 (1907) 9 GLR 351 at 352.
27 (1907) 9 GLR 351 at 352.
28 (1907) 9 GLR 351, 352; the Court refuses Monika’s partner’s request to be
released from paying costs ‘as he had acted on the telegram and thought he
was entitled to marry Monika … he took the risk arising out of his very
imperfect inquiry.’
29 (1907) 9 GLR 351 at 352.
30 (1907) 9 GLR 351 at 352.
31 The Court states that the Marriage Ordinance 1842 applies. While the
Court does not give the dates of their marriage by the clergyman, presumably its use of the Marriage Act 1904 means that they if occurred after that
date. If this is the case, then applying the 1842 Ordinance is incorrect, as it
was repealed in 1891.
32 [1918] NZLR 903 at 905; [1918] GLR 483 at 485.
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